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Abstract:
Despite a growing widespread recognition that police unions represent a major
component of policing and have major influences on aspects of policing such as disciplinary
procedures, day-to-day management, and police-community relations, they have until recently
been largely ignored by police scholars. In light of significant gaps in knowledge regarding
police unions and the impacts that they have on law enforcement behavior and police
accountability, this paper utilizes a case study approach to analyze all existing union contracts
between the Portland Police Association (PPA) and the City of Portland in order to explore the
prevalence of particular contract provisions that critics have placed under scrutiny as having the
ability to impede fair and thorough investigations of officer misconduct or otherwise inhibit
accountability. Findings show that PPA all contracts dating back from 1969 contain at least one
provision that has the potential to thwart accountability efforts. Findings also show a general
trend of increasing additional controversial provisions over the course of elapsing contract
bargaining agreements.
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Introduction
Within the last decade, multiple highly publicized accounts of police involved deadly
uses of force against minorities have led to peaked interest from scholars and activists in police
accountability, simultaneously raising concerns about racial disparities within the U.S. justice
system and the role that law enforcement plays in a racially hierarchical society. These killings
and the lasting strains that they impose in the communities these deaths occur in have caused
already tense police-community relationships to become further fragmented. In the midst of
widespread demands for reform and the removal of barriers to officer discipline after the 2014
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MI and the recent killing of George Floyd by former
officer Derek Chauvin in Minneapolis, MN, police unions have emerged in the public eye as
stark defenders of officers who have been accused of excessive uses of force and as critical
opponents to reform efforts.1 In the wake of nationwide unrest, Minneapolis Police Officers
Federation president Bob Kroll made multiple controversial public comments as the Minneapolis
police force came under pressure by promising to fight the firing of the four officers involved, by
dismissing George Floyd’s death through calling attention to what he calls Floyd’s “violent
criminal history”, and by framing protests in response to Floyd’s death as a “terrorist movement”
that has made officers into scapegoats.2
The phenomenon of police unions acting as rhetorical and legal barriers to officer
discipline and institutional reform—much like the phenomenon of disproportionate police
killings of Black people—has a longstanding history in the United States. In the early years of
unionization, police unions in Philadelphia and New York were already striking down major

1
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civilian review boards.3 Indeed, the major push for unionization in the 1960s was in large part a
response to the implementation of reforms that were meant to improve police-community
relations and reduce racial tensions.4 In accompaniment to fighting reform, collective frustrations
have been raised by police chiefs, elected government officials, and concern community
members over police disciplinary processes—which are largely determined by statutory labor
laws and union bargaining negotiations—over how difficult it seems to be to fire or discipline
officers who have committed acts of misconduct.5 Instead, communities are often forced to hire
back guilty officers or significantly reduce their awarded discipline. For instance, in 2007 an
Oakland officer shot and murdered a 20-year-old man who was unarmed. A couple of months
after the fact, the same officer "killed another unarmed man, shooting him three times in the back
as he ran away."6 Oakland paid a $650,000 settlement to the victim’s family and fired the officer.
However, during the disciplinary requests measure, a judge requested the City of Oakland to
rehire the officer and award him with the pay he had lost while terminated.7 Similarly, in 2010,
Portland officer Ron Frashour was responding to a mental wellness check at a residence upon a
report of a man inside who was significantly distraught over the recent death of his brother.
When officers convinced the man to exit his home, he came walking backwards with his hands
over the back of his head toward the officers. After slightly lowering his hands, one officer
shoots multiple beanbag rounds at the man, and officer Frashour shoots the man once in the back
with a live round, killing him. Frashour was initially fired and the City of Portland issued a $1.2
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mil settlement to the victim’s family, but after appealing to an arbitrator he was reinstated and
has returned to work as of 2016 (after spending two years on paid leave).8
Collective bargaining rights allow unionized police officers to negotiate over the terms
and conditions of their employment. One of the central features of collective bargaining in
policing relates to the disciplinary process. This is pretty standard, given that rank-and-file
officers and management both want clearly defined discipline procedures. However, authors
have found that there are numerous common provisions outlined in union contracts that are likely
to obstruct effective investigations of police misconduct and shield guilty officers from
discipline.9 According to Kevin Keenan and Samuel Walker (2004), general encumbrances in
union contracts that are the biggest causes for concern include: extremely broad language that
applies also to routine supervision and is not exclusive to investigations of misconduct, formally
established waiting periods that delay investigations, pre-disciplinary hearings that allow peerranked officers to serve on the board conducting the hearings, statutes of limitations imposed on
the use and retention of officer misconduct data, and conditions on the time and place of
interviews.10 Stephen Rushin (2017) also identifies several provisions under scrutiny such as
providing officers with evidence prior to conducting an interview, limiting the length of an
investigation, limiting civilian complaints, limiting civilian oversight, and providing for
arbitration. In a study of 178 bargaining agreements across the U.S., which govern the working
conditions of around 40% of all municipal officers, Rushin (2017) found that around 88%
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Martha Bellisle. Fired repeatedly, but back on the job: Police officers in misconduct cases routinely
return to force through arbitration process. Chicago Tribune. www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ctnw-police-misconduct-arbitration-20200624-de63ttai3nh6hpfefb6ruf64yi-story.html, see also
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contained at least one provision that has the potential to thwart legitimate disciplinary
proceedings against officers involved in misconduct. A smaller study of 39 union contracts
containing disciplinary provisions for officers in some of the biggest cities in the country
conducted by Harris and Sweeney (2019) found that all but one contained provisions that could
be threatening to accountability.11 Furthermore, a recent and seminal study by Abdul Rad (2018)
from Oxford University of contracts and LEBoR provisions in 100 largest U.S. cities has
discovered a positive relationship between police protections and cases of abuse in police
practice.12
Despite serious allegations and anecdotal evidence that police unions demonstrate the
ability to successfully obstruct efforts to promote police accountability, it remains a puzzling fact
that they remain a severely neglected area of study.13 Police unions are complex and always
changing, and research on police unions is sparse and unbalanced. Researchers have a
particularly difficult time accessing fully accurate information such as data on officer use of
force or the number and nature of deaths caused by police officers due to the fact that many
police departments refuse to comply with laws that require the accurate reporting of such
information or to provide private information to scholars.14 This gap in literature is problematic
during a time when police accountability has often topped media headlines.
This project offers an alternative approach in exploring the broad concerns of police
union impact on accountability and police-community relationships by applying them to a single
case study of the Portland Police Association (PPA) in Portland, OR, which represents 900
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members that include the officers and sergeants of the Portland Police Bureau. This project
analyzes union contracts between PPA and the City of Portland over the course of time that the
PPA has had bargaining rights in order to identify the prevalence of protective contract
provisions related to disciplinary processes and police accountability and identify when these
protections first appeared in negotiations and whether they appear to increase over time. Study of
this particular independent union is valuable for multiple reasons. PPA is currently the longest
standing police union in the United States. The department this union represents is in one of the
biggest U.S. cities and has appeared in comparative studies of unions. The Portland Police
Bureau has a long history of documented accounts of officers involved in misconduct or abuse
who have been shielded by discipline, leading to frustrated community activists, families of
victims, and civil rights attorneys. As a case study, this project benefits in providing a detailed
account of union characteristics and how they have changed over time for a union that has likely
stood in some ways as a model for some of the police unions around the country that emerged
later.
This paper has been structured into several sections. First, supplementary information on
the history and background of police unionization is provided, followed by a summary exploring
the existing research on the top cited concerns of policing, which has been split into main
arguments on ideological or obstructionist concerns of police unions. The next section covers a
review of the scope and methodology of the case study that has been performed along with an
explanation of the variables that have been chosen. Each of the indicated variables will be
discussed individually in the results section before concluding with a brief discussion of overall
findings.

7

Framework and Considerations
This paper proceeds on the assumption that employees in the private and public sector
have a fundamental right to participate in unions and to engage in bargaining negotiations over
the terms and conditions of their employment.15 The extent of these rights is subject to
negotiation with management, policy decisions, and local/state/federal law. In addition to the
right to join a union, this paper also recognizes that employees have a legal right to due process
in regard to disciplinary action, which includes the right to be informed of any charges of
misconduct, the right of a fair hearing involving said misconduct, and a right to appeal any
unfavorable disciplinary action that results from the investigation.16 Once again, the range of
these rights are subject to negotiation with management, policy decisions, and local/state/federal
law.
Background and Literature
Although it wasn’t until the late 1960s that police unionism began to establish as a widely
accepted form of labor organization with bargaining power in the eyes of police department
management and the general public, the struggle for police officers to organize and gain the right
to bargain collectively can be traced back to the turn of the 20th century.17 In A Historical
Overview of Police Unionization in the United States, Marvin Levine (1988) notes that the first
campaign to unionize police officers occurred when the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
began issuing charters to police labor organizations in 30 large cities including Boston after
departments became overwrought with complaints of low pay, long hours, lack of opportunities

15
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for rebuttal on management decisions, nepotism among officers, and general dissatisfaction that
became inflamed after the outbreak of World War I due to effects of nationwide inflation that
had nearly doubled the cost of living during the time.18 These efforts by the AFL were met with
immediate criticism from police chiefs throughout the entirety of the nation, who held the
sentiment that police officers should hold the same level of professionalism as a soldier or a
sailor would, and argued that they wouldn’t be able to commit themselves to any group aside
from an independent benevolent or fraternal organization without inherently removing the
principle of neutrality from the practice of policing. Other police reformers and multitudes of
unionized laborers such as dockworkers and miners had similarly adverse reactions to the idea of
unionization, as police reformers feared that their efforts would be stifled in the process of labor
negotiations and other union workers recalled police officers’ often violent history of union
busting.19 The initial push for police unionism came to a swift end at the point when threefourths of the rank-and-file officers within Boston’s police department staged a strike as a result
of Police Commissioner E.V. Curtis’s refusal to recognize their union and to suspend some
officers who had joined.20 The Boston Police Strike of 1919—which resulted in days of civil
unrest and 9 deaths and caught the attention of President Woodrow Wilson, who referred to the
strike as a “crime against civilization”—would heavily influence the opinions and actions of city
government and police management regarding the unionization of police over the course of the
next century.21
The second campaign for police unionization occurred in the 1940s and 50s when the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), as well as the

18
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State, County, and Municipal Workers of America, began issuing charters to local police
departments across the nation as they each sought to increase their influence in public sector
occupations. According to the book Pistols, Pickets, and Politics: A History of the Portland
Police Association, a historical narrative about the Portland Police Association by Susan G.
Hauer (1996), it was the officers of the Portland Police Bureau who pioneered this campaign in
1942 in their efforts to establish a union. After reaching out to several other national union
organizations who refused, the AFSCME agreed to work with them and issued a charter for the
Portland Police Association on a strict no-strike stipulation, drawing on fears from the past.22
The establishment of the PPA was met with the same concerns and criticisms that police unions
throughout the country had been experiencing at the time. A 1942 edition of the Oregonian
voiced these concerns in one of their publications, citing that the police would always be publicly
suspected of displaying a greater loyalty to the union over their official duty.23 Portland’s Chief
of Police during the 1940s, Harry Niles, would refuse to recognize the union up to the point of
his death in 1946. While Chief Niles never fired any officers who joined like other police chiefs
had been doing in other cities such as Boston, he would typically demote anyone who claimed to
be a member. The AFSCME would spend the next 9 years issuing out 36 additional charters to
local police departments, although most of these new unions一excluding the PPA, which became
the nation’s longest running police union as a result of these efforts一would once again swiftly
dissolve or become banned until the 1950s and 1960s, when the establishment of the Taft-
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Hartley Act, the Wagner Act, and John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 would extend the
formal legal right to bargain collectively to most public sector and federal employees.24
Levine (1988) highlights that the 1950s and early 1960s enumerated a time when rankand-file police officers were becoming increasingly frustrated with working conditions (which
hadn’t substantially improved over the first half of the 20th century) as well as frustrated by new
waves of departmental reforms that arose out of the civil rights movement, such as the call made
by the American Civil Liberties Union to create civilian review boards that would directly
address complaints against officers who had been accused of misconduct or malpractice.25 The
desire of rank-and-file officers to acquire some form of shared power in reform-making
decisions became a major goal for officers continuing to unionize in the 60s, and remains a
major component of police unions today. Many new unions became established in the public
sector as new and better-versed leaders of private fraternal and benevolent organizations were
successfully pressing elected officials on the municipal and state levels for formal grievance
procedures by working in local elections, appealing to courts, and lobbying in city halls.26
Ultimately, city officials determined that refusing these demands were no longer a worthwhile
endeavor. By the early 1970s, rank-and-file organizations in at least 10 major cities were granted
dues checkoffs, bargaining rights, and formal grievance procedures.
As of 2017, it has been best estimated that out of 800,000 sworn officers, approximately
75-80% are members of unions.27 Around 80-85% of these unions are classified as independent
and have no affiliation with national labor organization groups, while 15-20% of these

24
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organizations are affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Walker (2008) notes that police unions are more
common among large police departments (and therefore, larger cities) than in smaller sized
departments where communities have smaller populations and are distinctly less common in the
southeast portion of the nation where unionism has historically been weak. Since the United
States doesn’t have a national police department, the formal duties and roles of police agencies
are determined by state statutes and local policies. Likewise, police unions are considered to be
highly autonomous and fragmented. A report from Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) in 2006 labelled police unionism as “disorganized labor” with a “maze of different union
affiliations”.28
Out of the existing literature analyzing police unions, police theorists, reformers, and
activists have presented anecdotal and empirical evidence arguing that police unions have the
ability to impact the roles and duties of policing and inhibit aspects of accountability in a variety
of ways: through the processes of collective bargaining and forming contracts with the city, by
establishing Law Enforcement Bills of Rights (LEBoR) within those contracts that grant officers
with extra disciplinary protections, by promoting a subculture of police that encourages
exclusive solidarity among union officers, by lobbying, fundraising, providing legal
representation, and by filing lawsuits.29 The most prominent concerns of police unions can be
conceptualized into 2 main categories: the ideological concern and the obstructionist concern.30
Scholars whose focus lies in the former concern of police unions prioritize the public relations
role of policing over the specific structural impediments presented by police unions, while the
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latter concern hones in on potential structural obstacles to reform or accountability of officer
misconduct.31 While the data analysis conducted in this paper focuses on the obstructionist
concerns of police unions, it’s important to recognize that these two categories present similar
arguments and often greatly overlap, as policing policies directly impact police-community
relationships.32
The ideological critique of police unions has become increasingly prevalent in literature
on policing, as police unions have long used their expression as collective and influential voices
to push back on efforts of reform and to support policies and politics that appear to inflame
community tensions. Some authors have focused on the relationship between police unions and
police roles, arguing that many police unions promote a subculture of policing that situates
officers in an us vs. them or ‘warrior’ mentality which has proven to alienate police from the
community, most particularly among people of color.33 Alex Vitale (2017) from The End of
Policing argues that this aggressive approach to policing can be partially explained by a
combination of ‘broken window’ policing policies and ‘tough on crime’ policing styles, the
increased militarization of the police as a result of the 9/11 War on Terror, and beliefs that entire
communities are suspicious, dangerous, or disorderly.34 He highlights the fact that black people
and other communities of color are disproportionately affected by this harsh style of policing;
lower income neighborhoods, which have a higher concentration of residents of color due to
forces like gentrification and structural inequality, are often classified as ‘high-crime’ areas and
are subsequently overpoliced without being provided with substantial services such as new
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schools or jobs that would potentially tackle the root of why crime may be occurring in the first
place. Efforts to promote more positive police-civilian interactions by emphasizing the service
role of policing, such as President Barack Obama’s 21st Century Task Force, presented by the
Community Oriented Policing Service office, have failed to produce substantial results. An
empirical study of police officer views and preferences of police roles conducted by John
Manageau and Raymond Hunt (1996) found that unionized officers place a higher emphasis on
the “law enforcement” component of policing—which includes activities such as making arrests
or issuing citations—over roles pertaining to order maintenance or service delivery.35 To the
extent that the law enforcement component was emphasized in departments, unionized officers
experienced higher discretion in their day-to-day duties, higher job satisfaction, and more
positive views on departmental personnel practices. As Cortright et al. (2018) discover in an
analysis of state statutes regarding police roles, state law still primarily focuses on the crimerelated components of policing, despite the fact that real responsibilities of the police role related
to crime stopping such as writing citations or making arrests accounts for less than 30% of day to
day duties.36
Mark Thomas and Steven Tufts (2020) find that the “us vs. them” subculture of policing
seems to have become exacerbated with the rise of police unions and has extended into a form of
exclusive solidarity among unionized officers which promotes activity such as implementing the
‘code of silence’ when an officer is faced with accusations of misconduct.37 Acknowledging that
police unions are heterogeneous institutions, the authors argue that through selective solidarity,
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these unions generally display support and collectivity among members and other police unions
while simultaneously setting boundaries between themselves and other members of the
workforce in a way that comes off as antagonistic or exclusionary. Outside of collective
bargaining, this support is shown by advocating on the behalf of fellow officers, defending the
police department when it falls under public scrutiny, and by involving themselves in broader
political activity such as lobbying and supporting desired candidates in campaigns. For example,
in 2009 when Portland Police Bureau officer Chris Humphreys was placed on paid leave pending
an investigation after he had shot a 12-year-old Black girl with a less-than-lethal beanbag round,
nearly 600 officers gathered in protest, adorning shirts that read “I am Chris Humphreys”, and
“Support The Police”.38 After Michael Brown was killed by Darren Wilson in 2014, previous
executive director of the St. Louis Police Officer’s Association Jeff Roorda repeatedly publicly
defended Wilson, appearing on multiple media outlets such as CNN to defend the police and
critique the unrest in Ferguson.39 One of the largest and most explicit displays of exclusive
solidarity to appear among police unions has been the Blue Lives Matter movement that first
appeared in December 2014, which was created by police unions as a reaction to the Black Lives
Matter movement that itself emerged as a response to widespread police violence against Black
people.40 Thomas and Tufts point out that the Blue Lives Matter movement demonstrates how
police union solidarity may undermine other expressions of working class solidarity, arguing that
by constructing a false equivalency between the two movements through casting police as
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unvalued actors and victims of violence, police unions are enfeebling critiques of racialized
violence being committed by the police and subsequently undermining other forms of working
class solidarity by repressing attempts of the general class to mobilize against a racially ordered
system.41
Academics and activists who have focused on the obstructionist concern of policing have
largely directed their attention toward how the collective bargaining process has become a major
tool of influence for police unions, the greatest issue of concern being the impact that collective
bargaining has on discipline and accountability regarding officers who are guilty of misconduct
or criminal actions. A special report on civilian complaints about police use of force in the
largest local and state police agencies in 2002 produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found
that out of over 26,000 citizen use of force complaints submitted to police departments, only
about 2,000 were determined to justify disciplinary action.42 In a second report conducted by
Campaign Zero, a police reform campaign organization that originated shortly after the launch of
the Black Lives Matter movement, it was found that out of at least 4,024 people killed by police
between 2013 and 2016, only 85 of these cases resulted in an officer being charged and
investigated for a crime. Out of those 85, only 6 officers were convicted.43 At the same time, out
of over 1,000 people killed by police in 2014 alone, nearly 60% of the victims didn’t have a gun
or were in situations that shouldn’t require armed police intervention, such as ‘quality of life’ and
mental health crises.44 Former police officer and current law professor Seth Stoughton—who
recently appeared as an expert witness for the prosecution in the trial for Derek Chauvin—

41

Ibid. p. 134.
Matthew J. Hickman, Citizen Complaints about Use of Force. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Department of Justice, 2006.
43
DeRay McKesson et al., Police Union Contracts and Police Bill of Rights Analysis. Campaign Zero,
2016.
44
Ibid.
42

16

alludes that one of the three main functions of police union contracts is to create “grievance
procedures that are often a central part of collective bargaining agreements that both discourage
and frustrate attempts to discipline individual officers”.45 Across a number of the nation's largest
cities, police supervisors and elected officials have found themselves practically powerless in
their ability to adequately investigate or punish officers who have been accused of misconduct
due to the disciplinary processes that have been created in part out of negotiations between
police union representatives and public government negotiators.46 These concerns grow ever
more pressing as multiple empirical studies have recently surfaced that link police unions—
particularly unions with problematic labor contracts—with increased accounts of violent
misconduct, such as the recent study by Abdul Rad from Oxford University of contracts and Law
Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights provisions in 100 largest U.S. cities has discovered a
positive relationship between police protections and cases of abuse in police practice (Oxford
2018).47
As for all private and public sector unions with collective bargaining rights, bargaining
allows unionized officers to negotiate over the terms and conditions of their employment, such as
wages and conditions of employment.48 State statutes and court decisions dictating what should
or shouldn’t be considered a negotiable condition of employment have allowed the disciplinary
process to become one of most central features of collective bargaining for police in many
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departments.49 While disciplinary processes include many basic legal due process protections
that apply to other public sector employees such as the right to be notified of charges, the right to
acquire legal representation, the right to a hearing, and the right to an appeal, many authors have
cited widespread prevalence of extra disciplinary protections are likely to obstruct effective
investigations of police misconduct and shield guilty officers from discipline.50 Kevin Keenan
and Samuel Walker (2005) along with Stephen Rushin (2017), one source of obstructive
protections stems from the emergence of Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBoRs),
which provide police officers with disciplinary protections that often aren’t given to other classes
of public employees.51 In their review of statutory LEOBoRs, Keenan and Walker (2005)
identified several general encumbrances in union contracts that are among the biggest causes for
concern, including: extremely broad language that applies to routine supervision and
investigations of misconduct, formally established waiting periods that delay investigations, predisciplinary hearings that allow peer-ranked officers to serve on the board conducting the
hearings, statutes of limitations imposed on the use and retention of officer misconduct data, and
conditions on the time and place of interviews.52 In a study of 178 bargaining agreements and
LEOBoRs across the U.S. which govern the working conditions of around 40% of all municipal
officers, Rushin (2017) found that around 88% of these contracts contained at least one contract
provision that has the potential to thwart legitimate disciplinary proceedings against officers
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts. Duke Law Journal, 2017. p. 1209. The Supreme Court’s 1967
decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, which barred states from using statements made by police officers
during investigations of misconduct in future criminal proceedings, helped establish the precedent of
awarding additional disciplinary protections to officers such as those found in Law Enforcement Officer
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involved in misconduct. These include, but are not limited to, provisions that establish formal
waiting periods before an officer may be initially interviewed, provisions allowing access to
evidence to be provided to an accused officer before an interview, provisions that set statutes of
limitations on the length of investigations, provisions that expunge officers’ disciplinary records
after a given period of time, provisions that limit civilian complaints, provisions that limit or
prohibit the use of independent civilian oversight to investigate police misconduct, and
provisions that allow for arbitration.53 In a similar study of 39 union contracts containing
disciplinary provisions for officers in some of the biggest cities in the country produced by
Harris and Sweeney (2019), all except one contained provisions that could obstruct
accountability efforts.54
Rushin (2017) argues that some of these provisions, such as the ones relating to the
circumstances surrounding officer interviews, prevent police management from adopting the
kinds of best policing practices that are outlined in various federal consent degrees and letters of
recommendation provided by the Department of Justice.55 These consent decrees require
investigators to write down officer statements as soon as possible, preferably at the scene of the
incident. By delaying interrogations or providing officers with evidence prior to their interviews,
Rushin argues that these contracts provide officers with sufficient time to corroborate stories in
ways that remove the blame from the police.56 Access to officer disciplinary records is limited by
law in a handful of states, but in many police union contracts, Rushin (2017) finds that even
police chiefs are prevented from using officers’ records. Many of these contracts even call for the

53

Ibid.
Christopher Harris and Matthew Sweeney, Police Union Contracts: An Analysis of Large Cities.
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 1-11.
55
Ibid. p. 1227.
56
Ibid. p. 1228.
54

19

destruction of disciplinary records—sustained or otherwise—after a specific period of time, or
otherwise prevent supervisors and investigators from considering an officer’s disciplinary
histories.57 Over the past two decades, police departments have developed Early Intervention
Systems (also known as Early Warning Systems) based on best practices, which are designed to
document a number of police performance indicators which sometimes but not always include
civilian complaints of officers and use-of-force reports. In theory, if a police department were
fully utilizing an EIS system to track patterns of problematic behavior, a large number of
complaints on a particular officer would prompt attention from management. However, due to
the largely unstructured nature of policing, the implementation of these systems hasn’t been
perfect in practice, often leading to outdated officer files or files lacking in detail.58 Moreover,
some police contracts disallow EIS systems from being considered for disciplinary investigation
purposes. Keenan and Walker (2005) argue if LEOBoRs disallow information to be included in
EIS systems, the utility of the system is limited.
The concept of creating a civilian oversight agency as a tool to assist the victims of police
misconduct has been prevalent among civil rights advocates since the early 1920s, though it
wasn’t around the 1980s and 1990s that civilian review boards emerged as a great national
movement and gained physical prominence.59 Despite their limitations, these agencies are
intended to allow members of the community to retain some level of sovereignty over the police,
which at the margin succeeds at bolstering some levels of confidence among members of the
community.60 As previously mentioned, the rise of civilian review boards in the 20th century
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was met with a fervent effort by police unions to limit the scope and power of civilian oversight.
For example, some police union contracts limit the subjects that a civilian review board is
allowed to investigate; others present ground rules on what the composition of administrators on
the board will encompass (such as Miami’s bargaining agreement from 2014, which allows
exclusively other officers to serve on the board).61 Likewise, Rushin (2017) finds that multiple
police union contracts disqualify some types of civilian complaints, either by limiting the use of
anonymous complaints or by establishing time limits on investigations of police misconduct,
which is unconducive of thorough investigation and thereby frustrates accountability.
While arbitration is recognized as a common mechanism used by public sector employees
to settle contractual disputes, its use in settling disciplinary appeals has raised concerns among
scholars who study policing.62 Due to the disciplinary appeals procedures established in these
contracts, police departments are often required to reduce disciplinary actions against officers or
rehire officers who had been fired as a result of misconduct. Moreover, arbitration processes in
most states allow third party actors to make binding decisions behind closed doors and place
limits on the judicial review of decisions made as a result of arbitration.63 Arbitration poses a
greater threat to achieving accountability when two conditions are met: (1) police union
representatives are in control of selecting the identity of the arbitrator, and (2) the arbitrator is
awarded the authority of conducting a ‘de novo’ review, which allows them to re-review any
relevant issues related to an officer’s appeal without the requirement to defer to any previous
decisions that were made by police supervisors, civilian review boards, or city officials.64 When
police unions are granted the power to select their own arbitrators, the danger is that arbitrators
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may feel incentivized to compromise on their disciplinary decisions in order to increase their
chances of being reselected for work. After the Supreme Court established that it’s legal and
appropriate for courts to refuse to review the legitimacy of an arbitration award, de novo review
creates a situation where an arbitrator may be mistaken in the facts of the matter or the law and
their decision would still be upheld.65 Creating such expansive standards of review for
contractual appeals encourages officers to appeal any disciplinary decision made to arbitration.66
Data and Methods
This study intends to address the research questions of at which point provisions
containing language that may impede investigations of misconduct or overall accountability
appear in PPA contracts as well as whether the appearance of these provisions has increased in
quantity over the 47 years that the PPA has been negotiating labor agreements with the City of
Portland.67 As highlighted above, authors Harris and Sweeney (2019) along with Rushin (2017)
indicate several key provisions from police union contracts and LEBoRs that may frustrate
efforts surrounding police accountability. The research that has been conducted was designed to
explore the prevalence of similar features within PPA contracts along with changes that have
occurred surrounding these provisions as the Portland Police Association develops as an
institution over time.
In order to address the questions presented in this study, I gathered, codified, and
analyzed the contents of all 12 PPA contracts as well as every publicly available edition of
PPA’s “Manual of Rules and Procedures”, as some of the articles within these contracts
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reference directives contained inside of the manuals. I used a quantitative archival content
analysis using specific variables to guide in order to extract relevant information from the
contracts. All of the gathered data were located through public archival databases found on the
official City of Portland website or the official PPA website.68 The years of these contracts span
from 1969-2016, and the Rules and Procedures gathered apply between the years 2007-2021.
My process involved reading through each of the contracts and scanning for
characteristics that may impede officer discipline or posit challenges to overall accountability.
For the purposes of this study, the general application of accountability is used to describe the
ability of public officials to uphold professional standards of conduct on the part of police
officers and to establish policies and procedures that allow for effective investigation of alleged
officer misconduct as well as the assignment of discipline where appropriate, although it’s
recognized that there are other dimensions to accountability that exist outside of the realm of
effective policies.69 The contracts were organized by year and indications were made at every
point that a contract contains a provision that falls under one of the directed variables, which
cover 6 main areas of concern: (1) provisions containing any condition that delays officer
interviews or interrogations after alleged wrongdoing for a specified length of time, (2)
provisions that provide officers with access to evidence prior to interviews or interrogations
about alleged wrongdoing, (3) provisions that limit or exclude investigations, interrogations, or
disciplinary action on the basis of anonymous complaints, (4) provisions that limit or exclude
civilian groups from receiving the authority to investigate, discipline, or terminate officers for
alleged wrongdoing, (5) provisions that limit the consideration of officers’ disciplinary history in
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investigations of misconduct or future employment decisions, and (6) provisions that allow or
require arbitration of disputes relating to disciplinary penalties or termination. These categories
were chosen because they represent some of the most prominent examples examined by Harris
and Sweeney (2019), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) of provisions within police
union contracts that potentially challenge accountability efforts. Special distinctions are made at
points where variables first appear in contracts over time, change in language or wording, and/or
disappear. A complete table of the charted results can be viewed in Figure 1 at the end of this
paper.70
Due to unanticipated circumstances surrounding the process of localizing and gathering
data for this study, it should be noted that there exists a gap in the data involving PPB’s Manual
of Rules and Procedures, where I was unable to locate information on any editions of the manual
produced prior to 2007. Because of this, there is missing information on provisions that limit the
consideration of disciplinary history and only a partial analysis can be conducted on this
particular variable starting from contract term 2006-2010A. This gap is depicted in the shaded
section of Figure 1.
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Figure 1.

Labor Agreements between the Portland Police Association and the City of Portland
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*A= This is a city ordinance announcing a contract amendment to the previous term of contract
and not a standalone contract term, although contracts indicated with ‘A’ have their own records.
Therefore, contract term ‘1986-1988A’ is interpreted to contain the same provisions as contract
term ‘1981-1983’ excluding specified amendments, and contract term ‘2006-2010’ is interpreted
to contain the same provisions as contract term 2002-2004.
1

= The language in the contract active during this designated set of years undergoes a change in

language that also alters the meaning of the identified provision.
Results
Delays Interview: The contract includes any condition that delays officer interviews or
interrogations after alleged wrongdoing for a specified length of time (such as 24 hours or two
days).
Labor contract agreements between the PPA and the City of Portland have contained
provisions that allow officers who are involved in a disciplinary investigation to delay
investigative interviews since the adoption of PPA’s second official labor contract with the City
of Portland, which was active between 1975-1977. This contract term establishes a mandatory
waiting period of “not less than twenty-four (24) hours before the initial interview commences”
or before any written reports are required from the officer.71 The provision relating to interview
waiting periods was edited in contract term 1999-2002, where the minimum advance notice
clause increases from 24 to 48 hours.72 This 48-hour waiting period has been sustained in the

[From PPA contract (1975-1977)] “Article 59. Officers Bill of Rights Section A3: Whenever delay in
conducting the interview will not jeopardize the successful accomplishment of the investigation or when
criminal culpability is not at issue, advance notice shall be given the officer [not less than twenty-four
(24) hours before the initial interview] commences or written reports are required from the officer.”
72
[From PPA contract (1999-2002)] “Article 61. Whenever delay in conducting the interview will not
jeopardize the successful accomplishment of the investigation or when criminal culpability is not at issue,
advance notice shall be given the officer [not less than twenty forty-eight (48) hours before the initial
interview commences] or written reports are required from the officer. The advance notice shall include
whether the officer is a witness or a suspect, the location, date and time of the incident, the complainant's
name, and the nature of the allegation against the officer.
71
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PPA contract agreements until its eventual removal in contract term 2016-2020, leaving only a
provision stating that “interviews and investigations shall be concluded with no unreasonable
delay”. The ‘no unreasonable delay’ provision is also contained in all contracts PPA drafted
since 1979. In each of these contracts aside from the very first draft from 1969—which doesn’t
contain any provisions specific to interview safeguards—there are sections of the article relating
to the due process rights of officers prior to interviews establishing that an officer who is under
disciplinary investigation is required to be notified of the nature of the investigation, whether the
officer is a suspect or a witness, provided opportunity to secure representation, and “informed of
other information necessary to reasonably apprise him of the nature of the allegations of the
complaint” prior to being interviewed.73 While an officer’s right to some form of representation
and advanced notice is considered to be standard due process, current strategies of best practice,
such as those outlined in DOJ consent decrees, encourage prompt investigations of potential
misconduct so that witnesses can be interviewed while their memories are still fresh and to
ensure that physical evidence can be preserved.74
Limits Anonymous Complaints: The contract prohibits supervisors from investigating,
interrogating, or disciplining officers on the basis of anonymous civilian complaints.
Prior to the PPA’s 1999-2002 contract, the names of complainants in disciplinary
investigations were only required in instances when the investigation resulted in charges being
filed against the officer. However, Article 61.2.1.3 from the contracts drafted between 19992017 contains a clause related to Internal Affairs Division investigations which requires the

[From PPA contract (2016-2020) Under Portland Officers’ Bill of Rights Preamble] Article 61 Section
2.2.9. Interviews and investigations shall be concluded with no unreasonable delay.”
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complainant’s name as a part of the mandatory advanced notice given to an officer before their
initial interview. In the most recent contract term (2016-2020), Article 61.2.1.3 has been omitted.
In 2001, the Independent Police Review board (IPR) and the Citizen Review
Committee were created as an extension of Portland’s City Auditor’s office to create a
civilian police oversight system. One of the IPR’s main functions is to receive and screen
complaints about Portland Police Bureau officers and monitor/participate in Internal Affairs
(IA) investigations. Guidance from the National Lawyers Guild in conjunction with the
Oregon Justice Resource Center on the IPR process notes that while citizens are technically
able to submit complaints in an anonymous fashion, IPR may decline to investigate if it’s
considered a minor complaint. Additionally, since the IPR has no power to discipline officers
on their own, cases that are approved for investigation are transferred to the Internal Affairs
Division, where the name of the complainant is provided at least to PPB internal AI
investigators.7576 Mandatory disclosure of complainant’s names raises serious concerns about
possible retaliation against people who are trying to hold officers accountable for
misconduct.
Limits Civilian Review: The contract prohibits civilian groups from being granted the
authority to investigate, discipline, or terminate officers for alleged wrongdoing.
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Prior to 2001, the Portland Police Bureau didn’t have an established system for civilian
review. While the creation of the Independent Police Review system is intended to increase
civilian involvement in police oversight, the PPA contracts outlining IPR place significant
limitations on its scope of powers and responsibilities. For example, Article 62.1.3. in the
contracts drafted between 2002-2020 prohibits IPR from investigating complaints related to
deadly use of force incidents or criminal investigations. While the IPR is allowed to make
recommendations to the Portland Police Bureau on suggested discipline, they aren’t given the
authority to impose discipline themselves. The IPR is also barred from having direct access to
officers’ personnel files and data reports and from using EIS databases during investigations.
In 2020, Portland voters overwhelmingly approved Ballot Measure 26-217, which would
replace IPR with a new civilian-run police oversight board that would be granted the power to
impose discipline and even fire officers. The new measure would also grant the review board the
authority to investigate use of force cases.77 The PPA pushed back against this new measure by
filing a grievance with the City two days after the passing of the measure. They argue that the
ballot measure has misled voters on what the review board is able to accomplish.78 PPA
representatives have also voiced their concerns in ongoing negotiations with the City, arguing
that the measure violates Article 3 of their contract, which states that “standards of employment
related to wages, hours and working conditions which are mandatory for collective bargaining”.
The question of whether or not disciplinary processes fall under the category of “working
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conditions” is one that has been hotly debated among police reformers, city representatives, and
police officers.79
Clause 20.2 in contract term 2016-2020, known as the ‘embarrassment clause’, states that
“if the City has reason to reprimand or discipline an officer, it shall be done in a manner that is
least likely to embarrass the officer before other officers or the public.” This provision has been
included in the PPA contract for as long as there’s been a contract. The wording of this provision
has been the same since 1969. The ‘embarrassment clause’ has been cited by the 2020 IPR
director Ross Caldwell as the primary barrier keeping the details of officers’ cases of misconduct
and subsequent discipline from being released as public record.80 Not only does this provision
make it difficult for outside investigators to collect or analyze information on officers accused of
misconduct, but this clause often also makes it difficult for the victims of malpractice from
officers to know the identity of the officer or whether any disciplinary measures were taken.
Limits Consideration of Disciplinary History: The contract permits the purging or
removal of disciplinary records from officers’ personnel files after a determined length of
time, or limits the consideration of disciplinary records in future employment actions.
While none of these contracts contained specific articles that were dedicated to the
destruction of an officer’s disciplinary history after a certain length of time, all 12 contract terms
refer to the PPB Manual of Rules and Procedures for additional details on PPB policies and
standards of practice. The manual contains directives related to various categories such as traffic
stops, crowd control situations, and disciplinary investigations including deadly use of force
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incidents. Although I was unable to obtain editions of the manual that are dated prior to 2007,
directive 330.00 from the editions of the Manual of Rules and Procedures post-2007 permit the
destruction of individual Internal Affairs Division case files and references upon officer request
after three years from the date of the incident have passed if the case has been exonerated,
unproven, or declined. Dismissed incident claims are not added to an officer’s file. Cases that
have been sustained are also eligible to be destroyed after 5 years have elapsed since the date of
the incident if the request is authorized by the Chief of Police and if the imposed discipline was
less than a demotion.81 Cases that result in an officer’s termination may be expunged after 10
years have elapsed.
In addition, PPA contracts place restrictions on the City’s use of the Employee
Information System (EIS) when conducting disciplinary investigations. The name of this
database varies between police departments and over time and other names include Early
Intervention System, Early Identification System, and Early Warning System (used by PPB in
the contracts from 1999-2013). An officer’s EIS (or EWS) compiles data on their performance
from the Portland Police Bureau and other sources to create a comprehensive review. The EIS
also tracks data on events or incidents that may occur on the job, such as firearm discharges,
injury of suspects in custody, police vehicle collisions, use of force events, and the reports of any
complaints bestowed upon officers who are on duty. However, the contracts prohibit the City

Portland Police Bureau, Manual of Policy and Procedure from Directive 330.00: “Unless otherwise
directed by the Chief of Police or court order, individual IAD case files and other references may be
destroyed after three years from the date of the incident when assigned the following case dispositions:
Exonerated/exonerated with a debriefing; Unproven/unproven with a debriefing; Declined; Mediated;
Service complaints; Administratively referred. All sustained IAD cases will be permanently retained in
files, unless expunged pursuant to all the criteria listed below: A minimum of five years have elapsed
since the incident date of the last sustained complaint; The discipline imposed was less than demotion;
Authorized by the Chief of Police.”
81
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from using EIS reports in disciplinary decisions. This restriction has been in place since the first
emergence of EWS in 1999.82 The provision expands in the 2013-2017 contract when EWS is
replaced with EIS to include a new detail which states that the City may use data on officers in
disciplinary decisions if that data is produced from outside of EIS databases.83
Provides Access to Evidence Prior to Interview: The contract provides officers with access to
evidence prior to interviews or interrogations about alleged wrongdoing (ex: complete
investigative files or written statements from other witnesses)
Officers who are under investigation for criminal misconduct are supplied with “all
material facts of the matter” related to their case at least 7 days prior to their mitigation hearing.84
Officers are also provided with complimentary copies and complete transcripts of their
interviews. By contrast, members of the general public typically have to fight weeks or months
to receive police reports about their investigations.85 Prior to 1999, officers under investigation
[From PPA contract (1999-2002) under Discipline]. Article 20 Section 3. The City’s Early Warning
System and the information developed therein shall not constitute nor form the basis for disciplinary
action.
83
[From PPA contract (2016-2020) Article 20 Section 4. The City’s Employee Information System and
the information developed therein shall not form the basis for disciplinary action but may be used for nondisciplinary notice purposes, such as development of work performance plans and letters of expectation.
The reports from EIS may not be used by the City for disciplinary, transfer or promotion decisions.
However, if the underlying data that appears in EIS is maintained separately by the City and is simply
reflected in the EIS, nothing in this agreement prevents the City from making appropriate use of the
underlying data in disciplinary, transfer or promotion decisions.
84
[From PPA contract (1999-2002) under Portland Officers’ Bill of Rights Preamble: When the
Investigation Results in Charges Being Filed] Article 61 Section 2.3.1. The officer, upon request, will be
furnished with a copy of all materials developed in the investigation which will contain all material facts
of the matter. [Such materials will be provided no later than seven (7) days prior to the officer’s
mitigation hearing and shall include any transcripts the City has prepared of recorded interviews.] The
obligation to disclose information to the officer under this section shall not apply to information required
to be maintained as confidential under federal or state law. See also, Article 61 Section 2.2.8. The
complete interview of the officer, noting all recess periods, shall be recorded and the officer upon request
will be provided a copy of the recording, or the officer may also record the interview at the officer’s own
expense. If the interviewed officer is subsequently charged and any part of any recording of the interview
is transcribed by the Bureau, the officer shall be given a complimentary copy thereof.
85
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were to be provided with a copy of the Internal Investigation Division’s summary report, which
includes all serious material evidence gathered during the investigation. Prior to the
commencement of an interview, Article 61 Section 2.1.1 relating to interview safeguards states
that officers shall be informed of “information necessary to reasonably apprise the officer of the
nature of the allegations of the complaint”.86 This section contains vague language that doesn’t
define what would be considered as necessary information or allude to what level of detail is
provided to an accused officer on the nature of the complaint, which could include the identity or
full statement of the complainant or details of evidence of misconduct.
Provides for Arbitration: The contract requires or permits arbitration of disputes relating to
disciplinary penalties or termination.
All 12 PPA labor agreements establish grounds for arbitration as a route of appeal to
appeal the results of disciplinary investigations. In each contract, arbitration is listed as the final
step of the grievance process for officers who wish to appeal the results of a disciplinary
investigation. The grievance procedure prior to the step of arbitration involves (1) appealing to a
direct supervisor, (2) appealing to the chief of police, and (3) appealing to the city’s mayor
(during contact term 1969-1977), commissioner-in-charge (during contract term 1977-1999), or
the Bureau of Human Resources (from 1999-2020). The primary method of choice in the
contracts for selecting an arbitrator is to alternately strike off the names of potential arbitrators
from a list provided by the City or PPA until a single name remains. The chosen arbitrator’s
decision is “final and binding”, although the arbitrator can only resolve grievances or reassign
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discipline under the scope of the contract. The approved methods of discipline are listed in the
discipline section of each contract (usually Article 20 or 21) and vary across each contract term.
In contract term 2016-2020, for example, approved methods of discipline include written
reprimand, suspension, loss of vacation time, discharge and demotion. In comparison, contract
term 1975-1977 includes additional disciplinary actions such as reduction of pay and extra duty,
but those have since been removed in labor negotiations. Each of the 12 contracts includes a
sentence proclaiming that nothing prohibits the City or PPA from producing a permanent list or
arbitrator.87
The use of arbitration as a means of settling contractual disputes is considered to be
standard due process for many negotiating unions for public employees, in part as a mitigating
condition to disallow strikes among public sector employees, although an observable number of
media outlets and scholars have flagged the concern that arbitration as a mechanism of appeal
may contribute to the recurrent reversals or lightening of internal disciplinary sanctions (Rushin
2017). Arbitration allows for third parties, who are often from outside of the community, to make
final and binding disciplinary decisions that can reverse the decisions of police supervisors or
civilian police entities. When combined with other features, such as the implementation of
alternative striking of potential arbitrator names or an established authority for arbitrators to
conduct a complete re-review of all issues concerning the appeal, arbitration may present as a

[From PPA contract (2016-2020) Article 22 Section 5. “To invoke arbitration, the City or the
Association shall request from the Oregon Employment Relations Board, a list of the names of five (5)
arbitrators. [The arbitrator shall be selected by the method of alternate striking of names under which the
first strike shall be determined by lot. The final name left on the list shall be the arbitrator.] Nothing in
this section shall prohibit the parties from agreeing upon a permanent arbitrator or permanent list. [The
arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding, but the arbitrator shall have no power to alter, modify,
amend, add to or detract from the terms of the contract.] The arbitrator’s decision shall be within the
scope and terms of the Contract and in writing.”
87
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more problematic method of limiting accountability in police departments in the U.S.. The
alternative striking method of selecting an arbitrator is intended to mirror the process of selection
for jurors in the justice system.88 The potential issue with using the same type of procedure in
internal disciplinary appeals is that it could incentivize arbitrators to compromise on the
punishment awarded on a consistent basis in order to increase the probability that they will be
selected for future cases.
Discussion
As can be seen from Figure 1, PPA bargaining agreements over time have slowly
accumulated an increasing number of potentially problematic contract provisions which prior
scholars have indicated represent common impediments to police accountability. While it was
hypothesized that the bargaining agreements would increase in police protections over time, it
was surprising to discover that out of all 12 contracts, the one that underwent the largest
structural change and added the highest number of extra disciplinary protections was contract
term 1999-2002. This is notable particularly because the late 1990s was at the crux of when
Community Oriented Policing programs presented by the U.S. Department of Justice began
rolling out training and technical tools designed to promote officer accountability and the
relationship between police and the community.89 The COPS office was established through the
1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. In 1996, members of the PPB
participated in a work group during a 200 participant symposium on the topic of ‘police
integrity’ hosted by the COPS office and the National Institute of Justice, where the main
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takeaway was outlined that “discussion of police integrity has been broadened from a narrow
focus on police officers’ behavior and internal investigations of corruption to an understanding
of the importance of other factors. These included leadership, command behavior, supervision,
organizational structure, selection, hiring, training, the disciplinary system, the police subculture,
community values, and political and economic conditions.”90 While it remains out of the scope
of this study to determine whether participation in COPS programs had affected the policing
culture or departmental practices of the Portland Police Bureau outside of what can be seen in the
PPA contract, the influences of these programs didn’t appear to have an impact on the prevalence
of officer disciplinary protections that might obstruct accountability.
The question of whether problematic provisions in PPA contracts will continue to
increase in the next few years remains to be determined. The guilty verdict and conviction Derek
Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd suggests that police across the nation will continue to
be placed under higher scrutiny for cases of misconduct. Recent events in Portland also suggest
that the public plans to continue to advocate for more police reform and accountability, such as
the overwhelming passing of the new civilian review board and the decision of the City of
Portland to remove $15 million from PPB’s budget after thousands of residents had written
letters and testified to remove $50 million from the budget.91 In an attempt to promote
transparency, the City of Portland has opened a few of their 2021 contract bargaining sessions
with the Portland Police Association for public viewing as they tackle many of the concerns that
have been brought up by city officials and community activists surrounding PPA contract
provisions. In these sessions, PPA representatives have already expressed their disfavor of a
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number of proposals from the City relating to disciplinary protections, including the
implementation of the civilian review board and the proposed removal of PPB’s ‘embarrassment
clause’.92 PPA union representatives have in turn proposed additional disciplinary protections,
including adding a statute of limitation on the length of disciplinary investigations.93 These
negotiations are ongoing.
This study was met with a few limitations. First, the sample size of the collected data (12
contracts covering ~37 years of policing as well as ~9 years of content from PPA Policies and
Procedures manuals) was too small to create a statistical measurement, meaning that all coding
and analysis processes were conducted by hand. Future studies that wish to conduct case studies
of contract analyses over time may consider increasing their sample size by adding additional
police bargaining associations covering a single location. Due to the fact that data was collected
and analyzed without the use of technology, this study relies on my own informed interpretations
of the language contained within these contracts as gathered from previous literature on labor
agreements and labor law, along with assistance from sources who are familiar with labor
contracts. A second and more significant limitation of the research conducted presents itself with
the fact that there is an extremely limited availability of access to information on police union
bargaining activities and police officer policies and procedures provided by the PPA which has
resulted in gaps of analysis, such as the missing information in the data collection of this paper
pertaining to the expungement of officer disciplinary records prior to 2007. Given that the PPA
represents the sole negotiating vessel between the City of Portland and the rank-and-file police
officers working for the Portland Police Bureau, thorough research on any impacts that the PPA
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might have on the practices and institutional outcomes of the Portland Police Bureau would be a
larger possibility if researchers were permitted reasonable access to transparent and
nonconfidential information. Finally, because police unions remain an understudied topic in the
available literature on policing, this study has worked with a limited amount of available
empirical research on the impacts that police unions have on various aspects of policing, and
there are a lot of questions concerning the direct and indirect powers exerted by police unions
that remain unanswered. Suggestions for future directions of empirical research relating to police
unions are expansive and include exploring whether and how police unions are able to influence
components of police management such as day-to-day operations or department innovation,
whether there is a measurable difference in the quality of police-community relationships in
unionized vs. non-unionized police departments, the impact of police unions on the policing
subculture, and possible influences of police unions on local or county finances.
Conclusion
Police unions represent a crucial component of policing and exhibit the ability to have
direct and indirect impacts on policing innovation, police-community relations, and
accountability. While the majority of statutory rights provided to officers represent standard
constitutional due process and don’t fundamentally represent barriers to police accountability,
authors have identified numerous provisions that could obstruct accountability efforts.
Piggybacking off of previous findings which indicate common contract bargaining agreement
provisions that are able to obstruct police accountability efforts, this paper uses a quantitative
archival analysis with guided variables to review the contents of labor agreement contracts
between the Portland Police Association and the City of Portland from 1969-2020 relating to
police disciplinary procedures and mechanisms of accountability. Findings indicate that while
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PPA contracts since 1969 have contained at least 2 provisions that might present challenges to
conducting fair investigations of officers who are accused of misconduct, over time the majority
of these extra protections increased in quantity and detail. Police unions and union contracts have
remained a crucially understudied area of research until recently, and more empirical research is
necessary to get a full picture of the extent to which police union contracts inhibit accountability.
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